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ABSTRACT 
Successful apprenticeship is often explained by effective contract enforcement. But what 
happened when enforcement was weak? This paper reveals that within early modern London, 
England’s dominant centre for training, the city’s court provided apprentices with near 
automatic exits from their indentures, and allowed them to recover a share of their premium, 
reflecting faults and time served. Between 3 and 8 percent of apprentices received court 
discharges. Easy dissolution was a response to unstable contracts. By supplying a 
straightforward mechanism to cut legal ties, the city reduced the risks surrounding 
apprenticeship and facilitated London’s rapid expansion.  
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London’s dramatic growth from marginal northern European city to global metropolis 
was one of the distinctive transitions in early modern history. The city’s expansion was 
underpinned by a complex of factors, many of which were perceptively sketched out by Tony 
Wrigley several decades ago.2 One of the most significant mechanisms facilitating the flow of 
people into the city was apprenticeship.  London’s field of attraction was vast. Between five and 
ten percent of English teenage males entered apprenticeships in the city in the seventeenth 
century.3 Apprenticeship’s demographic importance was matched by its economic significance 
in reproducing the skilled workforce of the nation’s largest centre for manufacturing and trade.4  
 
Yet apprenticeship in London, and England more generally, had a forbidding aspect that 
is easily overlooked. Youths entered much longer terms of service than their peers on the 
continent.5 The minimum term of seven years allowed little adjustment for prior skills or ability. 
To enter the more profitable trades, apprentices often paid a substantial fee to their master.6 
Moreover, fewer than one in two of those who entered apprenticeships would become 
freemen of the city, able to establish businesses and take apprentices of their own.7 For masters, 
the likelihood that apprentices would leave before completing their indentures presented its 
own problems: if apprentices quit masters could not offset any early investment in training and 
maintaining them against their skilled labour in the latter part of their term.8 The high costs and 
substantial risks involved in apprenticeship were surely accentuated by the isolation and youth 
of the apprentices: most came from homes far from the city, and they rarely had prior ties of 
kinship or connection to their masters before entering service.9 
 
                                                
2 E. A. Wrigley, "A Simple Model of London's Importance in Changing English Society and Economy, 
1650‐1750," Past and Present 37 (1967): 44‐70. 
3 Chris Minns and Patrick Wallis, "Rules and Reality: Quantifying the Practice of Apprenticeship in 
Early Modern England," The Economic History Review (online early, 2011), 4. 
4 A. L. Beier, "Engine of Manufacture: The Trades of London,” in The Making of the Metropolis: 
Essays in the Social and Economic History of London, 1500‐1700, ed. A. L. Beier and Roger Finlay 
(London, 1986), 141‐67. 
5 Bert De Munck, Technologies of Learning: Apprenticeship in Antwerp Guilds from the 15th Century 
to the End of the Ancien Regime (Turnhout, 2007), 60‐68. 
6 Chris Minns and Patrick Wallis, "Contracting for Human Capital: Premiums and Apprenticeship 
Training in Pre‐Industrial England," L.S.E Department of Economic History Working Papers, no. 154 
(2011). 
7 Minns and Wallis, “Rules and Reality”. 
8 Patrick Wallis, "Apprenticeship and Training in Premodern England," Journal of Economic History 
68, no. 3 (2008): 836‐38. 
9 Tim Leunig, Chris Minns, and Patrick Wallis, "Networks in the Premodern Economy: The Market for 
London Apprenticeships, 1600‐1749," The Journal of Economic History 71, no. 2 (2011): 413‐43; 
Patrick Wallis, Cliff Webb, and Chris Minns, "Leaving Home and Entering Service: The Age of 
Apprenticeship in Early Modern London,” Continuity and Change 25, no. 03 (2010): 377‐404. 
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That thousands of youths became apprentices each year makes it clear that these 
problems were overcome, but it does not explain how this success was achieved. For an 
explanation, some historians have emphasised the importance of contract enforcement 
mechanisms, both formal, notably guilds and city authorities, and informal, such as the 
reputational costs of quitting.10 This approach is inspired by a wider literature on contractual 
problems in modern training. The uncertainties that beset early modern apprenticeship were an 
extreme example of the problems of asymmetric information and incomplete contracting 
observed in modern training, which are often overcome through additional incentives and 
monitoring. 11 Social historians of youth have drawn parallel conclusions. Faced by disorder in 
early modern households, the broad strategy of guild and city institutions was to ‘heal the rift’, 
as Griffiths puts it, returning master and apprentice to their appropriate place.12 
 
This paper describes a very different, and entirely neglected, side of apprenticeship in 
London: the city’s system of contract dissolution. I suggest easy dissolution played a vital role in 
sustaining apprenticeship in London, and was apparently echoed in a weaker form elsewhere in 
England. Dissolution was, it must be emphasised, normal. Metropolitan apprenticeship was 
fundamentally unstable. Many apprentices left their master after only a few years of service.13 
Premiums offered some compensation for the risk of departure: apprentices likely to leave paid 
                                                
10 S. R Epstein, “Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe,” 
Journal of Economic History 58, no. 3 (1998): 684‐713; Jane Humphries, “English Apprenticeship: A 
Neglected Factor in the First Industrial Revolution,” in The Economic Future in Historical Perspective, 
ed. Paul A. David and Mark Thomas (Oxford, 2003), 81‐91; Farley Grubb, “Does Bound Labor Have to 
Be Coerced Labor? The Case of Colonial Immigrant Servitude Versus Craft Apprenticeship and Life‐
Cycle Servitude‐in‐Husbandry,” Itinerario 21, no. 1 (1997): 38‐41. Although see Sheilagh Ogilvie, 
“Guilds, Efficiency, and Social Capital: Evidence from German Proto‐Industry,” Economic History 
Review 57, no. 2 (2004): 302‐14. 
11 James M. Malcomson, James W. Maw, and Barry McCormick, “General Training by Firms, 
Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy,” European Economic Review 47, no. 2 (2003): 197‐227; 
Wendy Smits and Thorsten Stromback. The Economics of the Apprenticeship System (Cheltenham, 
2000). 
12 Paul Griffiths, Youth and Authority: Formative Experiences in England, 1560‐1640 (Oxford, 1996), 
298‐324, quote 322. See also: Joan Lane, Apprenticeship in England, 1600‐1914 (London, 1996), 2‐4; 
Olive Dunlop and Richard Denman, English Apprenticeship & Child Labour (London, 1912). More 
generally: Gwenda Morgan and Peter Rushton, “The Magistrate, the Community and the 
Maintenance of an Orderly Society in Eighteenth‐Century England,” Historical Research 76, no. 191 
(2003): 62‐65; Steve Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds: Structures of Life in Sixteenth‐Century London 
(Cambridge, 1989), 234‐7. 
13 Minns and Wallis, “Rules”. See also: Griffiths, Youth, 330‐334; Ilana Krausman Ben‐Amos, “Failure 
to Become Freemen: Urban Apprentices in Early Modern England,” Social History 16 (1991): 155‐72; 
Steve Rappaport, “Social Structure and Mobility in Sixteenth‐Century London,” London Journal 10, 
no. 2 (1983): 116‐117. 
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more.14 Even without premiums, masters could avoid losses by balancing apprentices’ work and 
training.15 But alongside these private solutions ran a public system. As I show, the city of 
London provided a formal institutional process, in the Lord Mayor’s Court, which gave 
apprentices a simple, cheap and effective means to cancel contracts, and a means to recover a 
proportion of their financial investment in training. The activities of the Court rebalanced the 
asymmetries of power involved in apprenticeship. It reduced the risks involved in entering 
weakly enforced training contracts in which prospective masters and apprentices had limited 
information about each other or about future conditions that might affect their capacity to 
work or train.  
 
Explaining the success of early modern apprenticeship through its mechanism for exiting 
contracts may seem perverse. Histories of labour and contract generally focus on the relative 
unfreedom of labour, not its agency, before the late nineteenth century. Apprenticeship was 
regulated by the Statute of Artificers, which was the foundation of a relatively rigid and 
exploitative labour market that later statutes intensified.16 Its rules tied labour into subordinate 
positions. Legally, service was requisite for many occupations. Masters could use the law to 
arrest apprentices who broke contracts, and they applied these remedies heavy-handedly to 
apprentices and other employees in the early nineteenth century.17  
 
Yet the applicability of an oppositional model based on domination and subordination to 
pre-industrial non-pauper apprenticeship is unclear. Before the nineteenth century, apprentices 
                                                
14 Minns & Wallis, “Contracting”. 
15 Wallis, “Apprenticeship and Training”. 
16 Simon Deakin, “The Contract of Employment: A Study in Legal Evolution,” Historical Studies 
in Industrial Relations, no. 11 (2001), 17-29; Robert J. Steinfeld, Coercion, Contract, and Free 
Labor in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 2001), 39-47; Douglas Hay and Paul Craven, 
“Introduction”, in Masters, Servants, and Magistrates in Britain and the Empire, 1562-1955, ed. 
Douglas Hay and Paul Craven (Chapel Hill, 2004); Christopher Frank, Master and Servant Law : 
Chartists, Trade Unions, Radical Lawyers and the Magistracy in England, 1840-1865 (Farnham, 
2010). 
17 Douglas Hay, “England, 1562‐1875: The Law and Its Uses,” in Masters, Servants, and Magistrates 
in Britain and the Empire, 1562‐1955, ed. Douglas Hay and Paul Craven (Chapel Hill, 2004), 59‐116; 
Marc Steinberg, “Unfree Labor, Apprenticeship and the Rise of the Victorian Hull Fishing Industry: An 
Example of the Importance of Law and the Local State in British Economic Change,” international 
Review of Social History 51, no. 2 (2006): 243‐76; Richard J. Soderlund, "Resistance from the 
Margins: The Yorkshire Worsted Spinners, Policing, and the Transformation of Work in the Early 
Industrial Revolution.” international Review of Social History 51, no. 2 (2006): 217‐42. 
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and servants found a more balanced audience among Justices of the Peace.18 London 
apprenticeship in particular had distinctive characteristics that suggest an alternative interplay of 
power and influence. Apprentices were often from gentry or wealthy families and represented 
substantial investments.19 They were the sons of their masters’ peers, sometimes of their social 
superiors. Although formally subject to their master’s patriarchal authority, they and their 
families possessed voice and agency.20 If we sought a modern parallel for early modern 
metropolitan apprenticeship, it would be in mass higher education, not blue-collar 
apprenticeship. And like today’s university students, apprentices sometimes discovered they had 
made bad choices and demanded an alternative. While this realisation might be motivated by 
anything from the appearance of a more attractive alternative, such as marriage, to a violent 
clash with their master, the outcome converged towards two pathways. If they and their master 
agreed satisfactory terms, the indenture could end privately. If not, then they could turn to the 
Lord Mayor’s Court. 
 
I 
 
The hub of London’s system for apprenticeship dissolution was the Lord Mayor’s Court.  
Held in the outer chamber of the Guildhall, with the City Recorder officiating, the Mayor’s 
Court had both a common law and an equitable jurisdiction. Among the city’s courts, it was the 
main court for cases involving city customs. In particular, it oversaw the discharge of apprentices 
from their contracts, as Justices of the Peace did elsewhere, hearing ‘any cause… between a 
master and his apprentice, bound according to the custom of the city of London, which intitles 
the apprentice to his discharge.’21 Under statute, it also heard suits from any mariner’s 
apprentice.22 Above it stood the Court of Aldermen. Until the 1640s, some apprenticeship suits 
                                                
18 Peter King, “The Summary Courts and Social Relations in Eighteenth‐Century England,” Past & 
Present 183, no. 1 (2004): 142, 148. 
19 C. W Brooks, “Apprenticeship, Social Mobility and the Middling Sort, 1550‐1800,” in The Middling 
Sort of People: Culture, Society and Politics in England, 1550‐1800, ed. Jonathan Barry and C. W. 
Brooks (Basingstoke, 1994), 52‐83; Patrick Wallis and Cliff Webb, “The Education and Training of 
Gentry Sons in Early Modern England,” Social History 36, no. 1 (2011): 36‐53. 
20 Ilana Krausman Ben‐Amos, “Service and the Coming of Age of Young Men in Seventeenth‐Century 
England,” Continuity and Change 3, no. 01 (1988): 41‐64; Griffiths, Youth, 74‐79, 221‐232; Rushton, 
“Matter”, 94. 
21 Thomas Emerson, A Concise Treatise on the Courts of Law of the City of London (London, 1794), 66. 
See also: Stephanie R. Hovland, “Apprenticeship in Later Medieval London, c.1300‐c.1530,” 
(Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Royal Holloway College, University of London, 2007), 24‐5; Penny Tucker, 
“London's Courts of Law in the Fifteenth Century: The Litigant's Perspective,” in Communities and 
Courts in Britain, 1150‐1900, ed. Christopher W. Brooks and Michael Lobban (London, 1997), 25‐42 
22 Mariners’ apprentices were bound under the custom of London and needed to be enrolled in the 
town the apprentice lived or the next corporate town: 5 Eliz. I, c.5, s. 12. 
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appeared there, occasionally to halt proceedings in the Mayor’s court or to deal with equity 
issues.  The approach of the Court of Aldermen echoed that of the Mayor’s Court, however.23 
 
At first sight, we might expect the Mayor’s Court to serve as a backstop, settling hard 
cases but shielded from most disputes. As Griffiths describes, powerful pressures for 
reconciliation operated through various agencies.24 Both apprentices and masters could turn to 
family and friends. William Palmer’s mother paid £14 to his master for fabric and rings he had 
stolen so he could re-enter service.25 In 1656 Edward Mundey’s father travelled 150 miles to 
London to persuade his master to keep him.26 Private arbitration was widely used, with each 
side nominating a representative.27 Livery Companies also arbitrated disputes and chastised 
masters or apprentices. The City Chamberlain heard complaints by masters and apprentices in 
his court at 3 shillings a time, as did Justices of the Peace outside the city.28 The Chamberlain 
had often been involved in disputes before they reached the Mayor’s Court, generally urging 
reconciliation.29 
 
If apprentices and masters reached an agreement to end their contract they would avoid 
the Mayor’s court. Ending an apprenticeship consensually required no external agency. 
Consensual departures are occasionally described in later suits. For example, Nicholas Greene 
described his apprentice asking to leave his service: for ‘mere Love’ Greene ‘did then deliver up 
… his parte of the said indentures' - although they later fought over returning the premium.30  
 
However, the potential for private resolution needs to be set against the centrifugal 
forces stressing apprenticeships. In the close confines of early modern houses, masters, their 
families and apprentices interacted constantly, with few opportunities to escape observation. 
Apprentices had little control over their situation: food, lodging and leisure were at their 
master’s discretion. While the contract endured, masters too were constrained to accommodate 
                                                
23 I am grateful to Michael Scott for allowing me to review a sample of petitions to the Court of 
Aldermen from his ongoing research. See also: Griffiths, Youth, 304‐4. The Sheriff’s Court may have 
had a role, but its records are lost and it was mentioned in just one suit (an apprentice arrested for 
damages): London Metropolitan Archive (LMA), CLA/024/07/01 (Stratford v Sewell). 
24 Griffiths, Youth, 298, 302‐307 
25 LMA, CLA/024/07/62 (Palmer v Brett).  
26 LMA, CLA/024/07/02 (Mundey v Browne) 
27 See: LMA, MC6/505A, MC6/506A. 
28 Hovland, “Apprenticeship”, 24; Betty R. Masters,The Chamberlain of the City of London, 1237‐1987 
(London, 1988). On the fee: John Greene, The Priviledges of the Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the City 
(London, 1708), 208. For JPs, LMA, MC6/479B, MC6/480A. 
29 See: LMA, CLA/024/07/01 (Wright v Barber), CLA/024/07/02 (Smart v Woodstock), MC6/257B. 
30 LMA, CLA/024/07/63 (Audley v Greene). 
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a youth whose idleness, incompetence or venality they might punish but not prevent. Sickness 
could make a promising apprentice a burden.31 Both faced incentives to break their agreement. 
Masters could duck difficult training or profit from apprentice’s premiums. Apprentices might 
prefer to earn a wage or serve a different master. A lucky few even inherited the wealth to live 
on; according to his master, Richard Nest’s inheritance had allowed him to ‘leave the citty and 
settle himselfe in the country.’32 Emotion and opportunism could preclude negotiation.33 
 
It was in this atmosphere, when apprenticeships collapsed without agreement over the 
contract, apprentices turned to the Lord Mayor’s Court. There, indentures could be cancelled. 
And they were in their hundreds each year.  
 
While the Court’s records have been explored for evidence about apprentices’ lives, its 
wider role has not been recognised.34 Apprenticeship provided much business to the common 
law side of the Court, although debt suits dominated. Unfortunately, the Courts records are 
extensive, partial and fragmented. Nonetheless, samples from its surviving files suggest that 
from the 1610s to the 1720s, at least three to eight percent of London apprentices entered Bills 
(table 1).35 The apparent increase in the proportion may reflect the limits of the estimates. 
However, the broad outline is clear: given that only around 40 percent of apprentices remained 
with their original masters, and another 10 percent would die, at least 10 percent of 
apprentices who left their original master used the Court.36 Formal legal institutions played an 
important role in ending apprenticeships in the city.  
 
                                                
31 See in particular, Margaret Pelling, “Apprenticeship, Health and Social Cohesion in Early Modern 
London,” History Workshop Journal no. 37 (Spring 1994): 33‐56. 
32 LMA, CLA/024/07/62 (Nest v Barrow) 
33 Griffiths, Youth, 295‐98 
34 Peter Earle, The Making of the English Middle Class: Business, Society and Family Life in London, 
1660‐1730 (London, 1989); Pelling, “Child Health”. 
35 I took five samples of Bills from the 1580s, 1610s, 1650s, 1690s and 1720s: 813 Bills were 
abstracted in detail, 231 in part, and counts of Bills were made for sample years described in Table 1. 
The 1580 sample was too fragmented to be used for counts. Michael Scott generously supplied 
abstracts of another 491 Bills. The sample available for the different statistics given below varies due 
to partial survival, and some differences between Scott’s abstract and my own. 65 cases brought by 
mariners’ apprentices have been excluded from these and subsequent statistics. 
36 Persistence rate: Minns & Wallis, “Rules”; Mortality rate: Leonard Schwarz, “London Apprentices 
in the Seventeenth Century: Some Problems,” Local Population Studies 38 (1987): 18‐22. Cf. Brooks, 
“Apprenticeship”, 75. 
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The Court saw a fairly representative cross-section of London’s apprentices. 37 When 
compared to a matched sample of city apprentices, those entering Bills were no more likely to 
be locals or citizen’s children, as one would expect if social capital mattered in the Court.38 
Female apprentices were rare, but did appear.39 Apprentice’s entered pleas throughout their 
terms (Figure 1), with a peak in the middle years when they were most likely to depart. 
Apprentices from wealthy backgrounds were somewhat over-represented. As table 2 shows, 
gentlemen’s sons appeared more often, and relatively poorer husbandmen’s sons less, than 
their share of the population of apprentices would predict. However, the Court was certainly 
not the preserve of the rich. Tailor, butcher and weaver were among the ten most common 
parental occupations reported in Bills; shoemaker and labourer were among the twenty most 
common.  
 
Apprentices came to the Court from a wide cross-section of Livery Companies, in 
numbers that generally matched their share of apprentices more generally.40 By the end of the 
seventeenth century, apprentices from the larger, prestigious and politically important, but less 
occupationally homogenous, ‘Great Twelve’ Companies were under-represented: regulation 
may have been weakening faster in these Companies, something also apparent in non-
completion rates.41 The Court was heavily used by youths learning relatively low-status trades. 
Wealthy merchant apprentices did appear frequently, bringing three percent of cases. However, 
the most common four occupations mentioned by apprentices were relatively menial: tailor, 
weaver, joiner and vintner.42 These were not trades associated with large premiums or high 
incomes. 
                                                
37 The comparisons below use a sample of apprentices from surviving Company registers: Cliff Webb, 
London Livery Company Apprenticeship Registers (London, 1994‐2011). The ‘All apprentices’ sample 
contains apprentices from each decade in which a Company’s records survive for 7+ years. Discharge 
Bills are filtered to match these Companies. Because stratification by Company shrinks the Discharge 
sample, I cluster Bills into two periods: 1610‐60 (n=381) and 1689‐1723 (n=239). For these periods, 
‘All apprentices’ contains 51,878 apprentices from 30 Companies for 1610‐60 and 34,177 from 56 
Companies for 1690‐1720. 
38 Citizens sons: Discharge Bills, 7% in 1610‐60, 11% in 1690‐1720; All, 7% and 15%. London & 
Middlesex origins: Discharge Bills, 7% in 1610‐60, 15% in 1690‐1720; All, 7% and 12%. None of these 
differences are statistically significant at a 10% level. 
39 9 of 1,304 Bills. 
40 Testing the distributions statistically is difficult given the small numbers of Bills from most 
Companies. 
41 Great Twelve Companies: 1610‐50, Discharge Bills, 48%; All, 51%. 1690‐1710, Discharge Bills, 24%; 
All, 31% (difference significant at the 95% level on a two sample Z‐test). The declining share entering 
the Great Twelve is due to changes in composition of the All Apprentices sample. 
42 Apprentices often reported both their master’s occupation and Company. Some may have 
reported their Company’s nominal trade. To address this we can restrict our sample to apprentices 
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The volume of apprenticeship suits, and their social depth, fits with evidence of intensive 
litigation over debt and other civil causes in this period.43 Apprenticeships ended in the Court to 
an extent we would expect from such a litigious society. This turn to formal institutions was 
eased by the low costs involved. Entering a plea in the Court cost just 4d, and a case could be 
brought to trial for 30s within a fortnight.44 
 
In certain respects, however, apprenticeship cases were unusual. The plea was itself 
distinctive. Written in French except during the Commonwealth, the apprentice petitioned the 
‘right honourable mayor and aldermen’ informing them that his master had breached the city’s 
customs.  The apprentice sought to be discharged and committed to another freeman for the 
residue of his term - the new master was almost never specified and may have never existed. 
Discharge petitions were brought only by apprentices: Emerson stated as a rule that application 
was ‘always at the instance of the apprentice’ in his treatise on City law. Apprentices could cite 
a number of causes. Emerson cited nine ‘usual’ causes: breaches of city rules (apprentices 
bound under fourteen years old; for fewer than seven years; and not enrolled before the 
Chamberlain), and breaches of apprentice contracts, particularly mistreatment (‘unreasonable’ 
chastisement; lack of food or necessaries; being turned out) and poor training (masters leaving 
trades; failing to instruct; or quitting the city).45 However, four out of five pleas alleged the same 
cause: non-enrolment.46 Failure to train was alleged by six percent, but only three percent of 
apprentices complained they had been turned out, lacked subsistence, or were bound under 
age. Even fewer alleged excessive punishment or other causes. 
 
Apprentices’ actions were also vastly more likely to reach a conclusion than other civil 
suits. Judgements were reached in four-fifths of cases, compared to three percent of debt suits 
in borough courts and twelve percent of business and debt suits at Chancery.47 Moreover, in 
nearly every case, the apprentice obtained their discharge. A substantial minority of cases never 
                                                                                                                                                     
learning different trades (eg: tailors in the Drapers’ Company). Then the most common trades are: 
tailor, weaver, joiner, merchant and haberdasher (in that order). 
43 C. W Brooks, “Interpersonal Conflict and Social Tension: Civil Litigation in England, 1640‐1830,” in 
The First Modern Society: Essays in Honour of Lawrence Stone, ed. A. L. Beier, David Cannadine and 
James M. Rosenheim (Cambridge, 1989), 357‐99; Craig Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The 
Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England (Basingstoke, 1998), 216‐242.  
44 Lex Londinensis; or the City Law (London, 1680), 5‐6. 
45 Emerson, Concise Treatise, 66‐67. 
46 924 of 1,172 Bills recording cause. 
47 826 of 994 cases (process was not recorded for all bills in Scott’s sample). See: Muldrew, Economy, 
255; Henry Horwitz and Patrick Polden, “Continuity or Change in the Court of Chancery in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries?" Journal of British Studies 35, no. 1 (1996), 54 tab 18.  
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reached judgement, but cases were dismissed only twice, and only twice did the court limit the 
discharge by specifying to whom the apprentice was committed. 
 
The Court’s process can appear monotonically dominated by apprentices. But their 
masters did sometimes defend themselves. The nature of Court records clouds our 
understanding of this area: where a suit stops with the original plea, arbitration and negotiation 
may have been involved, but so could many other factors. For most Bills, however, the master’s 
response, even just their lack of response, is recorded. Masters who chose not to defend 
themselves simply ignored the Court summons.  The apprentice was then discharged 
immediately. If a master wished to defend themselves, they would appear in Court. But even 
then, most never went beyond appointing an attorney or entering an answer. Few cases – only 
30 of 944 in the sample - reached the final stage of empanelling a jury. 
 
In almost three quarters of cases, masters simply failed to appear in Court. However, 
their response depended on the cause: masters accused of non-enrolment, of leaving their 
trade or the city rarely appeared in Court to defend themselves (table 3, panel A). But masters 
accused of excessive chastisement, turning away apprentices, or binding youths under age 
often contested bills.48 Accusations of excessive chastisement, in particular, led masters to fight 
vigorously: although cited by barely one percent of Bills, they led to thirteen percent of jury 
trials. As table 3 panel B also shows, these cases were also far less likely to reach a judgement, 
presumably as a result of the masters’ resistance. Whereas 86 percent of cases citing non-
enrolment produced a discharge, just 54 percent of cases alleging excessive chastisement did. 
Cases citing a lack of necessaries or training were also less conclusive. 
 
No master’s defence ever changed the Court’s standard decision: judgements were 
inevitably discharges, even in jury trials. By contesting Bills, masters won time to respond to, and 
perhaps halt, the complaint outside the Court, presumably by negotiation. Time was a tool in 
disputes: as William Palmer later suggested, his master’s opposition to his suit was ‘upon 
purpose to vex and delay.’49 For the master, a successful defence ended with the Bill left 
stationary in the Court’s files. We might thus regard a fair proportion of the fifth of cases that 
did not end in a discharge as instances where apprentices were reconciled with their masters, or 
reached some private arrangement. That masters defended themselves most vigorously when 
                                                
48 Physical abuse cases were also less often discharged in Northern Quarter Sessions: Rushton, 
“Variance”, 99. 
49 LMA, CLA/024/07/62 (Palmer v Brett). 
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they were accused of mistreatment or bad training surely indicates an underlying concern with 
reputation. 
 
The lack of successful defences by masters does not imply they made no effort to 
maintain apprenticeships. As in debt cases, these suits often came late in a longer process.50 
Apprentices generally entered Bills after leaving their master. However, their contracts had often 
broken down gradually. Apprentices and masters regularly attempted to overcome problems 
informally. Numerous cases mention masters accepting runaway apprentices back after parental 
intervention, or negotiating compensation for embezzlements. For example, one master’s 
witnesses described how, when his apprentice returned after absenting himself, he ‘did receive 
him kindly… in hope thereby to oblige him to be the more diligent in his business for the 
future.’51  
 
While the Court showed much consistency over this period, there were changes. In the 
causes cited, non-enrolment fell from 100 percent of late sixteenth century Bills to 62 percent 
of early eighteenth century Bills. A cluster of causes centred on training emerged alongside it, 
with Bills citing instruction directly or implicitly in citing being turned out or a master quitting 
the trade.52 More tellingly, the proportion of cases reaching a judgement fell substantially: from 
more than nine-tenths of Bills in the early seventeenth century, to less than two-thirds at the 
end.53 Where obtained, the judgement itself remained unchanged. Whether this reflects a shift 
in regulation, court practice or apprenticeship itself is uncertain. But both developments might 
plausibly be consequences of the increasing demand for premiums by masters: this might 
increase concern among apprentices over training quality, and gave masters a greater incentive 
to negotiate over their exit, as they might be expected to return part of the money.54 
 
The peculiarities of the Court bear re-emphasis. For apprentices, a Bill provided a near 
certain discharge from their indentures. When they cited non-enrolment, no defence existed. 
Even when citing other causes, they were still generally discharged, although the process might 
be slower. That the Court discharged apprentices on a technicality meant it was not itself a 
contract enforcement mechanism, as it might have been if it examined contractual 
performance. Rather, the apparent certainties of apprenticeship indentures were unravelled by 
                                                
50 Muldrew, Economy, 199‐203.  
51 LMA, MC6/495A. 
52 In 1690‐1720, training was cited by 10%, turning out by 7%, leaving trade by 7% (N=303). 
53 91% in 1570‐1650; 59% in 1690‐1720. This shift is not the effect of the shift in causes. 
54 On premiums, Brooks, “Apprenticeship”, 70‐71. 
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the Lord Mayor’s Court: there, London gave institutional recognition to the fact that many 
apprenticeships would fail. 
 
II 
 
While the outline of the city’s dissolution mechanism is clear, it leaves us with several 
questions. Non-enrolment demands explanation in particular. Why did masters not enrol 
apprentices when this allowed them to quit on a technicality? Moreover, did masters really have 
so little agency? Was the power to exit indentures distributed as asymmetrically as it seems? 
Finally, how could apprenticeship survive – even prosper - if contracts were so easily 
abandoned? 
 
The questions of non-enrolment and masters’ agency are interconnected. Enrolment was 
a master’s responsibility.55 City custom required apprentices’ indenture to be enrolled by the 
City’s Chamberlain in his registers within a year of binding.56 The freeman’s oath included 
swearing to enrol apprentices.57 Company registration was a separate, prior process. The 
enrolment fee was low: 2s 6d, plus 4d to the clerk, as it had been since the 1500s. Any saving 
needed to be set against the fine of 9s 2d imposed when an apprentice who was not enrolled 
became a freeman.58  
 
Yet non-enrolment was widespread. The loss of the city’s apprenticeship records makes 
impossible to establish actual rates of enrolment, but estimates can be obtained from the fines 
paid by new freemen: between one quarter and a half of apprentices who became freemen had 
not been enrolled from the mid-sixteenth to the early eighteenth centuries, with signs of a 
decline in the rate of enrolment over time.59 An alternative measure is available for the 1730s 
and 1760s, when the Chamberlain’s accounts indicate that apprentices were enrolled in only 
                                                
55 If the apprentice refused to attend, the master could enrol indentures on his own: Greene, 
Priviledges, 305. 
56 On the development of apprenticeship customs: Hovland, “Apprenticeship”, 151‐183. 
57 Some Rules for the Conduct of Life (London, nd), 22‐23.  
58 Fee level for 1680 recorded in Lex Londinensis, 42. This remained the same in the 1830s: Second 
Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Municipal Corporations in England and 
Wales: London and Southwark: London Companies, House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers, 
c.239, vol. 25 (1837), 59.  
59 Enrolment rates derived from freedom fines reflect practices around 10 years earlier. Percentage 
enrolled: 1550s, 76% (196 of 257); 1660s, 56% (123 of 215); 1681, 64% (196 of 307); 1699, 60% (56 
of 93); 1711, 63% (147 of 234). Sources: 1550s, Charles Welch, Register of Freemen of the City of 
London in the Reigns of Henry VIII and Edward VI, Middlesex Archaeological Society (London, 1908), 
2‐40; 1660s, LMA, COL/CHD/FR/01/003, 245‐280; 1680‐1700, LMA, COL/CHD/FR/02/04‐05 (Dec 
1681‐Jan 1682), COL/CHD/FR/02/141 (May 1699), COL/CHD/FR/02/279‐281 (March‐May 1711). 
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slightly higher numbers than freemen were freed.60 As around half of apprentices would 
become freemen, this also suggests that only around half of apprentices were enrolled.  
 
This breach of city regulations was repeatedly condemned by city officials. 61 The capacity 
non-enrolment gave an apprentice to escape their contract was cited as a major problem, 
leading to:  
‘the Ruin of Hundreds of them; for being sensible that it is entirely in their Power to leave 
their Service whenever they please, they too often presume upon it to behave in an 
unbecoming Manner to their Masters, to neglect their Business, and to take … bad Courses.’62  
This prospect of misbehaviour should, one imagines, have encouraged masters to enrol 
apprentices. Yet officials attributed masters’ inaction to a mistaken belief that, by not enrolling 
apprentices, ‘they have it in their Power to part with them if they should prove disorderly.’63 
Certainly, there is every sign of complicity. Non-enrolment had one key consequence: 
facilitating discharge. The obvious beneficiary was the apprentice, who initiated any suit and 
was freed by the judgement. Perhaps unsurprisingly, several masters asserted that it was the 
apprentice who had been ‘unwilling to be inrolled.’64 But apprentices only obtained this 
contractual break-point through their master’s inaction, and the frequency of non-enrolment 
suggests many were willing facilitators. 
 
Why would masters agree not to enrol an apprentice? Apprentices’ families may have 
bargained for non-enrolment before binding if they considered premature departure likely and 
wished to avoid any difficulties. Non-enrolment may thus parallel with the practice in the King’s 
Bench of borrowers confessing judgements in advance so that lenders could ‘take uncontested 
legal action in case of default.’65 There is some evidence for this. The odds of discharge 
seemingly increased among apprentices who were not enrolled: four-fifths of actions alleged 
non-enrolment, yet around half or more of apprentices were enrolled.66 Non-enrolment would 
be more useful where a premium was at stake, as it strengthened the apprentice’s hand in 
negotiating a transfer and quickened access to the equity side where they could recover some 
                                                
60 In 1729‐30, the city registered an average of 1304 freemen and 1330 apprentices, in 1759‐60, the 
numbers were 878 freemen and 1059 apprentices: LMA, COL/CHD/FR/10/1/6, COL/CHD/FR/10/1/9. 
61 See for example: Lex Londinensis, 43‐44; Some Rules for the Conduct of Life; Greene, Priviledges, 
28‐30; The Freemen of London's Necessary and Useful Companion (London, n.d.), 50‐52. 
62 Some Rules for the Conduct of Life, 23. 
63 Some Rules for the Conduct of Life, 23. See also: The Pocket Remembrancer; or a Concise History of 
the City of London (London, 1750), 152.  
64 LMA, CLA/024/07/62 (Sutton v Woodrow). See also: LMA CLA/024/08/84 (26 Mar 1687), 
MC6/518. 
65 Brooks, “Interpersonal conflict”, 359, n. 9 
66 Conversely, easier exit may also have encouraged departure, as the City warned. 
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of their money. Non-enrolment increased over time, as did the use of premiums (although the 
weakening economic influence of the City may have also lessened masters’ concern in the same 
period). And there is evidence that non-enrolment was associated with larger premiums, 
implying that apprentices’ families sought to protect larger investments.67  
 
Masters may have also valued non-enrolment for their own reasons.  This might seem 
perverse, given that it weakened their position. However, where masters worried that an 
apprentice might be unsatisfactory, by avoiding enrolment they provided the apprentice with a 
means for discharge if they ejected them. This may seem over-complicated. But in later cases, 
apprentices repeatedly mention friends advising them to cite non-enrolment, even when they 
claimed the master had turned them out.68 Non-enrolment brooked no opposition for the 
apprentice, and, for the master, it also preserved their reputation from public accusations 
of fault. 
 
Apprentices regularly offered a darker version of this analysis: masters avoided enrolment 
to encourage apprentices to quit in order to obtain their premium. Richard Nest, for example, 
said his master neglected enrolment 'on purpose to give your orator … occasion to sue forth his 
indentures thereby intending to keepe himself ye sd fifty pounds.’69  Worse, apprentices such as 
Joel Burford described his master beating him ‘to force [him]… to quit his service but also to 
keep to his own use the said Thirty pounds.’70 William Browne claimed his master had 
'purposefully and wifully ommitted and neglected to inroll’ him. Having falsely accused him of 
embezzlement, Browne’s master extorted a bond from his guardian, threatening to turn him 
out 'saying that your orator was not enrolled.’71 Masters themselves explained non-enrolment 
by ignorance, ‘mere forgetfulness’, or the press of business, just as some apprentices, perhaps 
                                                
67 Premiums are only available for Equity cases (see below): this omits apprentices without 
premiums and biases the sample to apprentices with large premiums. The mean premium in Equity 
cases citing non‐enrolment was £83 against £69 for other causes (n = 243). However, the difference 
is not statistically significant at the 10% level (t = 1.25). 
68 See, eg: LMA, CLA/024/07/88 (Chamberlain v Jennings), no instruction; CLA/024/07/88 (Prouting v 
Lawford) turned out; CLA/024/07/88 (Steventon v Houlditch) subsistence.  
69 LMA, CLA/024/07/62 (nest). See also CLA/024/07/62 (Tayler v Spicer), CLA/024/07/63 (Anderton v 
Fountain), CLA/024/07/63 (Audley v Greene), CLA/024/07/63 (Hatt v Botley), CLA/024/07/63 
(Thornecomb v Taylor); CLA/024/07/88 (Prouting v Lawford), CLA/024/07/89 (Abbingdon v 
Peacocke); CLA/024/07/01 (Richards v Blanchard), CLA/024/07/02 (Smart v Woodstock). See also: 
Griffiths, Youth, 317  
70 LMA, CLA/024/07/88 (Burford v Apleford). Similar charges are common, eg: CLA/024/07/02 
(Chapman v Roberts). CLA/024/07/02 (Power v Foster), MC6/502, MC6/504B. 
71 LMA, CLA/024/07/62 (Browne v Brerewood). Similar charges in CLA/024/07/62 (Palmer v Brett), 
CLA/024/07/63 (Giles v Rogers). 
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occasionally with good reason, claimed they had not known about enrolment’s importance.72 
However, widespread ignorance is scarcely credible given the scale of the Court’s business. 
 
Even if masters saw some advantages in non-enrolment, the apparent autonomy over 
exit this gave to apprentices is hard to reconcile with standard accounts of apprenticeship. 
Indeed, the ease of discharge in the Court seems to leave masters with remarkably little control. 
However, the apprentices’ role in Court process did not mean masters’ had no agency. Masters 
could themselves terminate contracts unilaterally by physically turning their apprentice away 
and refusing to receive them again. As Robert Fary reportedly told one apprentice’s father, he 
would not keep his son any longer and ‘if he did not take care of him… he would immediately 
turne him out of doors.’73 Masters’ theoretical obligation to provide for apprentices appears to 
have carried little weight. Informal arbitration could not force masters to take back an 
apprentice against their will. As later Equity cases indicated, turned out apprentices had little 
option but to sue for discharge in the Court to prevent their ‘further ruin’: that pleas were 
always entered by apprentices did not mean that dissolution was always their decision. Masters 
therefore even avoided the legal costs of terminating apprenticeships. 
 
Masters also had greater disciplinary powers over apprentices while they remained in 
their service. As well as being able to punish apprentices themselves, they were supported by 
other institutions. As Hay noted, the Chamberlain’s Court, which provided a venue for 
apprentices and masters to complain about misbehaviour, was substantially biased in process 
and practice, as were provincial Justices of the Peace.74 Masters appealed to the Chamberlain 
more often than apprentices. Where the Chamberlain might admonish an unsatisfactory 
master, a recalcitrant apprentice risked committal to Bridewell.  By the 1830s, there had ‘been 
no committal of a master for a century and a half.’75 The Chamberlain’s records before the late 
eighteenth century are lost, but as table 4 shows, in the 1780s and 1830s, the Court was 
primarily a resource for masters, and regularly imprisoned apprentices. 
 
By contrast, apprentices lacked an equivalent mechanism for secure informal exits and 
had a weaker position within negotiations. If they departed without permission they were in 
theory vulnerable to pursuit and punishment. Their indentures put them at risk of being 
pursued at law if they entered another contract, whether of apprenticeship or service. 
Moreover, any bond given for their honesty might be actioned by their master, and any 
                                                
72 Forgetfulness: LMA, CLA/024/07/62 (Phelps). 
73 LMA, MC6/499A (deposition for the master). 
74 Hay, “England”, 82, 94. 
75 Second Report of the Commissioners, 101. 
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premium forfeit. However, once discharged, they were free to find a new master or leave the 
city.76 The liberties the Mayor’s Court gave apprentices were thus at best a rebalancing of a 
basic inequity in apprenticeship contracts. 
 
III 
 
Relatively easy dissolution raises its own problems for apprenticeship. Apprentices and 
masters both invested in training. Apprentices’ families, in particular, often gave large sums to 
masters to obtain positions, as well as supplying valuable sets of clothing. Premiums have 
sometimes been interpreted as contract enforcement mechanisms.77 If they were lost when 
apprentices defaulted, they might operate as such: without money, apprentices struggled to 
fund a premium for a replacement master. However, the abundance of discharges, and other 
evidence of apprentices departing early, suggests that this constraint was generally overcome. 
In practice, instead of being forfeit, premiums were, in part, repaid to apprentices who left 
early. 
 
In consensual departures, informal negotiation could cover premiums. Charles Bathurst’s 
father even included this in the negotiation over binding his son: if his son left, two pre-selected 
referees were to redistribute his £200 premium.78 Where negotiation failed, the solution lay in 
the Equity side of the Lord Mayor’s Court. Obtaining a discharge judgement allowed 
apprentices to petition for repayment of their premium and other expenses. The Court had 
exclusive jurisdiction in such cases.  
 
The archives of the Equity side of the Court have attracted historians’ attention because 
of the detailed narratives about apprenticeship recorded in its ‘interrogatories’, its sets of 
witness depositions.  However, to appreciate the function of these suits we need to turn to a 
                                                
76 Apprentices entering discharge bills could later become freemen. Searching the freedom records 
for four companies suggests discharged apprentices became freemen in comparable numbers to all 
apprentices: Apothecaries, 35% (n=17) discharged apprentices vs 38% of all apprentices; 
Clothworkers, 24‐31% (n=66) vs 34%; Stationers, 37% (n=27) vs 41%; Merchant Taylors, 13‐35% 
(n=132) vs 23%. Ranges for Clothworkers and Stationers are good matches (by both apprentice and 
master name) and possible matches (just apprentice name). Sources: Apothecaries, Guildhall Library, 
MS8200/1‐4; Clothworkers, Institute of Historical Research, ‘Clothworkers' Membership Database’; 
Stationers, Michael Turner, London Book Trades Database (2006), http://sas‐space.sas.ac.uk/290/ 
(accessed 30 August 2011); Merchant Taylors, Merchant Taylors Membership Index, 1530‐1928, 
Docklands Ancestors (London, 2009). 
77 Epstein, “Guilds”, 691. 
78 LMA, CLA/024/08/72 (7 Apr 1668). See also: MC6/503B (redistribution on apprentice’s death) 
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different set of the Court’s records: the ‘decrees’ which record its judgements.79 Decrees 
summarise Court business, and are noted on single sheets each covering a day. For 
apprenticeship suits, they name the plaintiff and defendant and summarise the case, noting the 
contract terms and why the apprenticeship failed. They then give the court’s judgement, 
indicating what share of the premium should be restored, and any allowances for costs or other 
issues, such as embezzlements. 
 
These records are not complete: the surviving decrees contain 245 apprenticeship cases 
from 1668 to 1707, with eight per year on average. The most from a single year is eighteen. 
Unfortunately, none of the Equity records are coherent series that provide a measure of activity 
in the Court. Between six and eleven ‘Questions’ (Bills initiating suits) survive from each year. 
Around half can be linked to decrees, suggesting around 16 cases a year. Linking decrees and 
interrogatories indicates that around 12 to 14 actions each year obtained interrogatories in the 
1670s and 1680s. With no way to estimate how often both Bill and decree have been lost, 
these are no more than rough minima. But with 200 or more discharge Bills in the Court each 
year, surely only a minority resulted in an Equity case. As the credible threat of an Equity case 
might allow private negotiation to succeed, it is nonetheless possible that many discharge Bills 
were entered with some anticipation of an Equity Case. Certainly Equity cases occasionally 
mention previous deals. Nicholas Hanbury, for example, had already returned £17 of the £80 he 
had received with his apprentice Humphrey Babington.80 While James Netherwood’s mother 
protested that if his former master had ever ‘offered any reasonable satisfaccon or proposalls’ 
about the premium, she ‘would have been very ready to have accepted of the same.’81 
 
Not all discharges would have led to an Equity case though. Equity cases were relatively 
expensive: costs were often awarded, but not always, and at around six pounds were 
substantial.82 Thus, Equity cases were brought by apprentices with large premiums: 53 percent 
paid £50 or more, compared to 13 percent of London apprentices in 1711-21 (figure 2). 
Apprentices who paid large premiums were a distinctive group. If we compare the social 
characteristics of plaintiffs in Equity cases to those seeking discharges, apprentices bringing 
                                                
79 LMA, CLA/024/08/072‐100. 
80 LMA, CLA/024/07/89 (Babington v Hanbury). See also CLA/024/07/01 (Okeover v Withers), 
CLA/024/07/02 (Smart v Woodcock), MC6/525B, CLA/024/05/016 (Edmonds v Braylsford), MC6/494, 
MC6/478A. 
81 LMA, MC6/518. 
82 George Kearsley, Kearsley's Table of Trades (London, 1786), 75. Higher costs were noted 
occasionally: £9 14s 8d in 1684 LMA, CLA/024/08/82 (Gerey v Sykes). 
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equity cases were more often citizens’ sons or locals.83 They were from higher status 
backgrounds: around 30 percent were the sons of gentlemen and esquires.84 And they were 
entering more prosperous trades: the largest occupational group were merchants’ apprentices, 
who brought 13 percent of Equity cases against just 3 percent of discharge Bills.85  
 
In several respects, however, the Equity side of the Court mirrored the Common Law 
side. Again, all cases were brought by apprentices and their families or guardians.86 And 
apprentices did generally recover some of their premium: only 26 of 244 plaintiffs received 
nothing back, and just 6 cases were dismissed.87 The Court’s judgements shared some of the 
mechanical regularity of Discharge suits. Even the proportion of the premium returned was 
quite predictable. As figure 3 shows, it declined steadily as the time served increased, 
suggesting a clear rule of thumb.88 Interestingly, the court apparently understood premiums not 
as compensation for the initial costs to masters from training new apprentices, but as fees for 
access and living costs: no year was worth much more or less than another, despite the 
increasing value of apprentices’ labour over time. 
 
Where the two sides of the Court diverge, however, is in the nature of the process. The 
rapid and homogenous resolution of Discharge Bills possesses a sterile inevitability. However, 
Equity cases produced heated and contradictory accounts of exploitation and contractual 
failure. While most Equity cases derived from discharges citing non-enrolment, they now 
reported a litany of abuses underlying the separation.89 In 61 percent of decrees either 
apprentice or master or both were found wanting. The Court identified a range of failings from 
general misbehaviour (drunkenness, surliness) to embezzlement or excessive correction. No 
single fault predominates, although embezzlement is mentioned in 17 percent of decrees.   
 
                                                
83 Citizens’ sons: 23% of Equity cases (n=55) and 11% of Discharges. London & Middlesex origins: 
47% of Equity cases (n=51) and 38% of Discharges. Discharges from 1690‐1720 used as the 
comparator to match period of Equity records. 
84 (n=51), against 14% of 1690‐1720 Discharges (n=122). 
85 (n=222). 
86 In a sample of 40 Equity Bills, 17 were initiated by apprentices’ fathers, 9 by their guardian, 6 by 
their mothers, and only 8 by apprentices independently: LMA, CLA/024/07/01‐02, 63, 88‐89 
87 One case where master undertakes to find apprentice a new position: LMA, CLA/024/08/84 (6 Mar 
1687) 
88 Note that figure 2 and subsequent statistics excludes any clothing given with apprentices, as this is 
valued in only 39 decrees. 
89 The proportion of Equity cases mentioning non‐enrolment (68%) is almost identical to the 
proportion of Discharge Bills for non‐enrolment in 1690‐1720 (66%). 
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For Equity cases, fault mattered. Indeed, in one case lack of fault meant that ‘The court 
forbeareth to decree the cause for that noe just cause appeareth agt the deft except want of 
inrollment.’90 The decrees reference only a fraction of the accusations that apprentices and 
masters made, which are apparent in their Questions, Answers and Interrogatories. As Pelling 
noted, these stories are often impossible to reconcile.91 To give one example from April 1691, 
Caleb Trenchfield’s deponents told how, when he met his apprentice James Ellis for arbitration, 
Ellis asserted:  
‘now he had sued out his Indentures by which he was cleared from him the defendant … 
he would now make the best of his time to his owne advantage urging it with a great deal of 
vehemency that he would not returne againe to the deft.’  
Yet Ellis’s own deponents said that it was Trenchfield who had protested that ‘he would 
not take [Ellis] againe for an hundred pounds.’92 Similarly extreme contrasts are apparent 
between the apprentice Prouting’s statement that he had been a day or two absent ‘upon some 
urgent occasion’, and his master’s assertion that Prouting had admitted that:  
‘he had been in St Giles during the said Time and that he had layen with Six whores, and 
that he lay with one of them three times in one night, and that he had been in company with 
Pickpocketts, and that he had received money of them as his share for handkerchifts which they 
had stolen.’93 
  
In these litanies of faults, Equity cases map the norms of apprenticeship in London. 
However, their accounting is ultimately financial. The bottom line was the apprentices’ 
premium. Masters sought to retain as much money as possible; apprentices’ to recover what 
they could. Apprentices’ broken heads, bad diet and paltry instruction were thus weighed 
against the unexplained absences and saucy words, thefts and threats which they dealt to their 
masters. Worn-out clothes, absences, stolen shop goods and medical treatment were all 
carefully quantified and if possible priced: complaints list the wages of journeymen employed in 
apprentices’ absence, apothecaries’ bills and garment prices. Apprentices protest that no new 
master could be obtained without a premium, and that their masters had faced no great 
expense in keeping them – the cost of their subsistence after departure was rarely mentioned.  
 
Fault was both moral and financial, however. Costs could only be measured as deviations 
from an ideal of apprenticeship in which each party fulfilled their oath to serve or instruct. The 
                                                
90 LMA, CLA/024/08/074 (24 Oct 1671). 
91 Pelling, “Child Health”. 
92 LMA, MC6/521A. 
93 LMA, CLA/024/07/88 (Prouting v Lawford). 
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court adjusted liability according to culpability. The final settlement reflected the behaviour and 
intent of each side. 
 
This post hoc balance-sheet explained the intense conflict over why an apprentice left: if 
a voluntary departure, it weakened their case; if driven off, it weakened their master. Although, 
masters could simply turn apprentices away, they preferred them to run. As a result, any 
absence could be seized upon. In one case, an apprentice returned from the Lord Mayor’s Show 
to find he was locked out.94 Any evidence that the other side favoured dissolution was 
important. Hence, John Walmesley’s suit was undermined when one of his master’s servants, 
Martha Bragg, recalled that: 
‘she hath heard the Complainant severall times say that he would not stay with the 
Defendant for that he had no mind to a handicraft trade and particularly the night before he 
went away [he] told this dept that he would and could goe from the Deft for that he was not 
enrolled & stayed out that night till past twelve of the clock on purpose (as this Deponent 
believeth) to give occasion for the Defendant to quarrel with him’ 95 
More pungently, another apprentices’ master’s mother, reported the apprentice saying he ‘did 
not care a fart for living with his Master… & did not care a turd for the £25 his master had with 
him.’96 In a similar vein, apprentices claimed they had been forced out ‘by vyolence’, as Weaver 
put it.97 Browne, for example, claimed his master had 'called for his pareing shovell and 
threatened to beate your orator down therewith and to charge your orator with a constable 
unless your orator would goe out of his doores.’98 For the same reason, the efforts each made 
to resolve their differences was emphasised: apprentices consistently describe repeatedly 
submitting themselves to their master, and masters to having ‘offered to reffer the said matter 
to any Indifferent persons’, as Lovelace Apleford put it.99 
 
If we take the faults mentioned in Equity decrees as those the Court believed proven, we 
can see how the algebra of dissolution worked. Table 5 reports the results of a regression in 
which the dependent variable is the share of premium returned to the apprentice by the Court. 
A series of dummy variables summarise the circumstances described in the decree. The 
coefficients can be interpreted as the shift in the proportion of premium the court returned 
                                                
94 LMA, MC6/433A‐B. 
95 LMA, MC6/526A. See also: MC6/527A. 
96 LMA, MC6/552A. 
97 LMA, CLA/024/07/62 (Weaver v Feathers) 
98 LMA, CLA/024/07/62 (Browne v [ ]).  
99 LMA, CLA/024/07/88 (Burford v Apleford). For apprentice submissions: LMA, CLA/024/07/88 
(Anderton v Hancock), CLA/024/07/88 (Whitchurch v Sambrooke).  
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where they occurred all else being equal (if multiplied by 100 they give percentage changes). 
For every year served, apprentices received around 12 percent less back. Where apprentices had 
misbehaved the amount they received fell by 6 percent.100 Similarly, when masters were at fault, 
they returned about 5 percent more.101 If apprentices had been sick, they received much less, 
having cost their masters money and earned little. Those bound under age also had less 
returned. Apprentices who paid a higher premium received slightly more back, suggesting a 
bias in favour of wealthy apprentices’ and – probably more importantly – their parents. In short, 
when apprentices or masters convinced the Court that the other was at fault, they profited. 
 
The Equity side of the Court provided a necessary means to resolve the financial 
consequences of the discharges in by its Common Law side. It was not as cheap or simple. But 
the integration of both sides of the system is clear. Where Discharge Bills allowed apprentices 
settle the contractual uncertainties left by a failed apprenticeship, the Equity side helped 
rebalance the advantage that possession gave to masters in negotiating over the premium. 
 
IV 
 
The surviving records of the Lord Mayor’s Court are largely from the seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries. However, the Court appears to have been actively involved in 
apprenticeship for far longer. Hovland concludes that even in the fourteenth century many 
apprentices ‘appeared only in order to be formally released from their apprenticeships’, and in a 
quarter of cases they had not been enrolled.’102 The Court’s role seems to emerge soon after 
apprenticeship customs were regularised in the later 14th century.103 It persisted into the 
nineteenth century. Suing out indentures for non-enrolment was mentioned in eighteenth-
century publications.104 In the 1830s, Parliamentary Commissioners noted discharges for non-
enrolment allowing apprentices to quit, and commented that the Equity side remained ‘almost 
entirely confined to bills of discovery and suits for compelling restitution of premiums to 
apprentices.’105 
 
                                                
100 ‘Apprentice faults’ include embezzlement (41), running away (24) and general misbehaviour (16). 
101 ‘Master faults’ include turning away apprentices (25), leaving off their trade for various reasons 
(22), failure to train (12), failure to provide necessaries (10), excessive correction (12) and other ill 
usages (5). 
102 Hovland, “Apprenticeship”, 130. Another third had masters who had left trading or the city; a 
third cited instruction; about 5% cited excess correction. 
103 Hovland, “Apprenticeship”, 129‐32, 158‐159. 
104 Michael Dalton, The Country Justice (London, 1742), 142‐3; James Bird, The Laws Respecting 
Masters and Servants (London, 1795), 29‐30; Kearsley, Kearsley’s Table, 75. 
105 Second report, 60, 127 
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This was a metropolitan system, developed in a city that dominated the nation’s 
apprenticeship training just as it dominated its economy. Outside London, there is no evidence 
that an parallel processes for discharge was in operation in borough courts. Enrolment was only 
required in some boroughs, and even then it was often patchy.106 Researchers on borough 
courts have not noticed similar bodies of plaints.107 Dissolutions and restitutions for contractual 
breaches did occur, however. The Statute of Artificers empowered Justices of the Peace to 
discharge apprentices on the complaint of either party and to punish recalcitrant apprentices. 
The system evolved to reflect social differences between apprentices: later statutes 
strengthening Justices’ powers to force apprentices to fulfil contracts applied only to 
apprentices with low premiums.108Justices made regular use of their powers, and provincial 
apprentices did often win discharges, although Quarter Sessions records suggest that the 
process was more contestable than in London.109  
 
Restitution of premiums is less visible beyond London. The central Equity courts of 
Chancery, Exchequer and Requests were sometimes employed by provincial apprentices and 
masters.110 By the eighteenth century, Justice’s guides generally suggested that they could order 
money to be restored ‘for this, by an equitable Construction of the Statute, is a Power 
consequential upon their Jurisdiction to discharge.’111 Certainly, cases at Quarter Sessions show 
Justices restoring premiums, but we lack a survey of this practice.112 While the tone of 
                                                
106 Peter Clark, “Migration in England During the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries,” 
Past & Present, no. 83 (1979): 61‐2; Margaret Pelling, The Common Lot: Sickness, Medical 
Occupations and the Urban Poor in Early Modern England (London, 1998), 216‐17. 
107 Personal communications from C. W. Brooks and Craig Muldrew. 
108 20 Geo II, c. 19, Para 4 (up to £5 premium); 6 Geo III, c. 25, s. I‐2 (up to £10 premium) 
109 5 Eliz I, c.4, Para 35. Rushton, “Variance”, 96‐98 especially; Ben‐Amos, “Service”, 55; Lane, 
Apprenticeship, 214‐27; King, “Summary”. 
110 Paul Seaver, “A Social Contract? Master against Servant in the Court of Requests,” History Today 
39, no. 9 (1989): 50‐56; Ilana Krausman Ben‐Amos, Adolescence and Youth in Early Modern England 
(New Haven, 1994), 210‐12; Henry Horwitz and Charles Moreton ed., Samples of Chancery Pleadings 
and Suits, 1627, 1685, 1735 and 1785, List and Index Society, Vol. 257 (London, 1995), 135, 276. No 
London Exchequer cases in published samples focus on premiums: Henry Horwitz and Jessica Cooke 
ed. London and Middlesex Exchequer Equity Pleadings, 1685‐6 and 1784‐5: A Calendar, London 
Record Society Vol. 35 (London, 2000), 7 
111 Theodore Barlow, The Justice of Peace: A Treatise Containing the Power and Duty of That 
Magistrate (London, 1745), 34. This power was tested and settled gradually: Kearsley, Kearsley’s 
Table, 81‐3; John Comyns, A Digest of the Laws of England, 4th edn. (London, 1800), 552; William 
Salkeld, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court of King’s Bench, new edn. (London, 1773), 67‐68. 
112 Cases in which a share of premiums is returned from three counties: W. Le Hardy ed., Middlesex 
County Records. Calendar of the Sessions Books 1689‐1709 (London, 1905), 2, 19, 20, 25; W. Le 
Hardy ed., Hertfordshire County Records. Calendar to the Sessions Books. Volume VII. 1700‐1752 
(Hertford, 1931), 92, 115, 133; W. Le Hardy and G. Reckitt ed., County of Buckingham Calendar to the 
Sessions Records. Volume II: 1694‐1705 (Aylesbury, 1939), 7, 18‐19, W. Le Hardy and G. Reckitt ed., 
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metropolitan and provincial apprenticeship overlapped, at first blush it appears that provincial 
apprentices lacked an exit procedure that was as cheap, quick and effective as that in London. 
 
London attracted a wide swathe of the children of England’s middling sort and elite into 
apprenticeship. From a distance, early modern apprentices can appear tied by oath, law and 
custom into an uneasy subordination. For early historians of apprenticeship reacting against 
sweated child labour, this feature – the tying down of youths into their master’s households – 
was one advantage of the institution.113 Law and custom, however, had a double nature in the 
city. As Brooks has suggested, thinking of household relationships in terms of contract 
undermined patriarchal ideals.114 While the Chamberlain and guilds aimed at reconciliation, 
whether through arbitration or punishment, the Lord Mayor’s Court cleared up the contractual 
and financial mess left when relationships ended. Acting on contractual breaches, often 
technical in nature, the Court put apprentices and masters asunder almost on demand. It 
restored premiums and costs according to an equitable construction that balanced faults and 
time served. In doing so, the City itself inverted household hierarchies, rebalanced asymmetries 
within apprenticeship, and substantially moderating the risks involved in entering expensive, 
long-lasting training contracts.  
 
That a corporate body populated by citizens whose cherished privileges included the 
taking of apprentices should act to undermine the employer, not the employee, could seem 
aberrant when set against in the general tendency of contemporary labour law to favour 
masters over servants, the practice and discourses of hierarchy and order, and the authorities’ 
anxiety to settle disputes in other contexts.115 Nonetheless, several countervailing pressures 
affected the city’s institutional pathway.  Collectively, the city depended on the migration of 
apprentices to survive and expand. The city’s citizens were parents, relations and guardians as 
often – perhaps more often – as they were employers. Even masters may have accepted the 
provision of escape clauses and guarantees to apprentices if they increased families’ willingness 
to fund training. The flood of apprentices choosing to train in London suggests the combination 
of arbitration and dissolution provided by the city’s institutions gave an additional advantage to 
the capital.  
                                                                                                                                                     
County of Buckingham Calendar to the Sessions Records. Volume III: 1705‐1712 (Aylesbury, 1939), 
10, 18. 
113 Dunlop and Denman, Apprenticeship, 187‐88. 
114 C. W. Brooks, Law, Politics and Society in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 2008), 383‐4. 
115 Deakin, “Contract”; Andy Wood, “Subordination, Solidarity and the Limits of Popular Agency in a 
Yorkshire Valley c.1596‐1615,” Past & Present 193 (2006): 41; Griffiths, Youth, 299‐350; Keith 
Wrightson, “The Politics of the Parish in Early Modern England,” in The Experience of Authority in 
Early Modern England, ed. Paul Griffiths, Adam Fox and Steve Hindle, 10‐46 (Basingstoke, 1996). 
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In the Lord Mayor’s Court, the city undermined the force of contracts, weakening 
property rights in labour. As a strategy, it runs opposite to standard assumptions about effective 
economic institutions and long-term training systems more generally. Its success was a 
consequence of the basic instabilities of early modern apprenticeship, and the private and social 
costs involved in reducing contractual failure through stronger enforcement. Of course, no 
direct measure exists for the effect of this system, and economic factors were the strongest 
force explaining the appeal of metropolitan apprenticeship. Nevertheless, we might reasonably 
conclude that apprenticeship in London thrived in part because of its institutions for contract 
dissolution. 
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Figure 1: Entry of Discharge Bills over Apprentices’ Term of Service 
 
Source: see text. 6 month rolling average shown. 
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Figure 2: Premiums mentioned in Equity cases and London apprenticeships, 1711-20. 
 
Source: London apprenticeships, 1711-20: all indentures to citizens registered for Stamp Duty (n 
= 13,709): TNA, IND1.  
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Figure 3: Share of Premium Returned in Equity Cases 
 
Source: See text  
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TABLE 1: Volume of Discharge Bills in the Lord Mayor’s Court  
 
Sample Years 
Sampled 
Discharge Bills 
per year 
Mean 
(min-max) 
Apprentices 
 indentured  
per year 
Share of indentures 
dissolved (%) 
1610 
1610-11, 
1618 
55 (39-71) 2,120 2.6-3.3 
1650 1651-3 96 (92-101) 2,760 3.5-3.7 
1690 1690-3 184 (153-252) 3,596 5.1-7.0 
1720 1718-20 146 (114-181) 2,338 6.3-7.7 
 
Note: Column 3: counts of Bills were taken from boxes of files chronologically spanning the 
sample years. Column 4: estimates of apprentices per year for 1610 and 1650 are extrapolated 
from Webb’s apprenticeship dataset; the 1690 estimate is a linear interpolation between the 
1650 estimate and the 1699 total in the City orphan tax records; the 1720 figure is a linear 
interpolation of the 1699 and 1730 totals in City orphan tax records. See: Minns & Wallis, 
‘Decline.’ Column 5: the range given in share of indentures dissolved is from mean to max bills 
per year; the minima presented in column 2 are likely to be undercounts due to sampling. 
Sources: Bills: LMA, CLA/024/02/44/13, 15-17, 19-20, 23, 26, 28-41, 43-46, 59-61, 64, 100-
101, 113-114, 116-120, 123, 125-129, 145-6, 148, 261-2, 264-272, 313-320. 
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TABLE 2: The social background of Bill presenters compared to the population of 
apprentices 
1610-50 All Discharged All Discharged 
 % % N N 
gentleman 11% 13% 2,622 44 
husbandman 14% 9% 1,446 30 
yeoman 20% 21% 2,803 70 
N   40,737 330 
     
1690-1720 All Discharged All Discharged 
 % % N N 
gentleman 9% 14% 7,016 17 
husbandman 5% 2% 7,097 2 
yeoman 10% 7% 10,870 9 
N   28,671 122 
Note: Table compares a sub-sample of Discharge Bills limited to apprentices from Companies 
where full apprentice listings survive. See note XX.  
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TABLE 3: The Outcome of Apprentices Petitions for Discharge by Cause 
  Defended (%)  Outcome (%) 
Cause Yes No 
 
 
(N) 
 D
is
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(N) 
Excess 
chastisement 
83 17 12 
 
54 0 0 46 13 
Non-enrolment 22 78 768  86 0 0 14 897 
Master left trade 20 80 20  66 0 0 34 29 
Master quit 
franchise 
20 80 10 
 
80 0 10 10 10 
Lack of subsistence 35 65 26  71 0 0 29 28 
Lack of training 47 53 59  74 2 0 24 58 
Apprentice turned 
out 
55 45 33 
 
74 3 0 23 35 
Apprentice under 
age 
62 38 29 
 
87 0 0 13 31 
Other 0 100 3  100 0 0 0 3 
Total 27 73 961  80 0 0 20 1,104 
 
Source: Petitions with cause recorded. The samples for defended and outcome differ slightly 
due to differences in data recorded. Other includes master’s widow marrying a non-freeman (2) 
and master not paying Stamp Tax (1) 
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TABLE 4: Cases in the Chamberlain’s Court 
 Plaintiff 1787 1789 1790 1831 1832 1833 
Masters (n) 183 153 147 124 89 75 
Apprentices (n) 53 30 19 35 34 36 
                TOTAL 236 183 166 159 123 111 
Penalty        
Apprentices committed for up to 1 month 
(n) 
n/a 39 39 37 29 23 
Apprentices committed for 1 to 3 months 
(n) 
n/a 24 21 8 8 1 
Masters complaints leading to Committal 
(%) 
n/a 41 41 36 42 32 
 
Source: 1787 data in Hay, ‘England’, p. 76; 1789-90 in: COL/CHD/AP/04/02/002, January 1789-
Sept 1793; 1831-33 in Municipal Commission, pp. XX.  
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Table 5: The Share of Premium Returned to Apprentice 
 Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Constant 0.71 (0.059)*** 
Term served -0.12 (0.010)*** 
Apprentice at fault -0.06 (0.032)* 
Master at fault 0.05 (0.029)* 
Apprentice under age -0.35 (0.137)** 
Not enrolled 0.03 (0.031) 
Master died 0.03 (0.048) 
Apprentice sick -0.23 (0.087)** 
Premium (log) 0.03 (0.014)* 
N 226  
R2 0.42  
 
Notes: OLS Regression. Significance level indicated at 1% by ***, 5% by **, 10% by *. 
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